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Abstract: This study investigates how support for Social Europe is related to citizens’ welfare 
attitudes. On the one hand, welfare attitudes can spill over from the national to the European 
level, given that Social Europe aims to achieve similar goals to those of national welfare states. 
On the other hand, support for the welfare state can be an obstacle, if citizens perceive the 
nation state and the European Union as competing or substituting governance levels. Using 
data from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study, we take a multidimensional approach to 
Social Europe, capturing attitudes toward social regulations, member state solidarity, European 
social citizenship, and a European social security system. Results demonstrate that citizens who 
are more positive about the welfare state are also more supportive of Social Europe. However, 
positive welfare attitudes do not affect all dimensions of Social Europe to the same extent. The 
spillover effect of support for basic welfare state principles is strongest for policy instruments 
of Social Europe that are less intrusive to national welfare states (EU social regulations). By 
contrast, welfare state critique has a stronger impact on support for more intrusive instruments 
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The debate on the social dimension of the European Union is generating more political 
discussion and controversy than ever before. The call for expanding Social Europe mainly 
comes from the political left, which is preoccupied with strengthening and preserving the 
achievements of national welfare states, and considers the development of Social Europe as a 
necessity (Føllesdal et al., 2007). Politicians and scholars have presented a number of 
arguments in favor of strengthening Social Europe, including the expectation that it would 
increase the popular legitimacy of the European project as it could compensate for the negative 
consequences of economic integration by providing social protection at the EU level 
(Fernandes and Maslauskaite, 2013).  
Nevertheless, little scholarly attention has been paid to citizens’ attitudes toward the 
EU’s social dimension and how these positions are related to their attitudes toward national 
welfare states. In this study, we approach Social Europe as referring to current or proposed EU 
governance that establishes supranational social policies and that affects social rights and 
policies in the member states (Martinsen and Vollaard, 2014, p. 680). In some respects, Social 
Europe strengthens the national welfare state, whereas at the same time challenging its 
foundations (Ferrera, 2017). For instance, social regulations can extend national legislation, 
whereas the coordination of social security rights prohibits that social benefits and services are 
restricted to member states’ own citizens. These two dynamics of Social Europe may generate 
different expectations about how attitudes toward national welfare states relate to support for 
Social Europe. On the one hand, attitudes concerning the national welfare state can spill over 
to the European area, given that both Social Europe and the national welfare state aim to 
achieve similar goals. On the other hand, it can be expected that support for the welfare state 
 
hinders support for Social Europe, if the nation state and the European Union are considered 
as competing or substituting governance levels (Burgoon, 2009).  
Previous research shows that in member states with high levels of income equality, 
citizens who support state intervention and income redistribution have more negative attitudes 
toward the EU (Garry and Tilley, 2015). Furthermore, citizens who are dissatisfied with 
national public services (Kumlin, 2009), evaluate their coverage as insufficient, and have less 
confidence in the sustainability of their national welfare state (Beaudonnet, 2015) are also less 
supportive of the EU. This may indicate that citizens either blame the EU for being the cause 
of their malfunctioning national system or consider it–at least in advanced welfare states–as a 
threat. Given these results, it remains unclear what citizens expect from the EU regarding social 
policy, and in particular how their welfare attitudes are related to support for Social Europe. 
By investigating multiple welfare attitude dimensions, the current study aims to pinpoint how 
welfare state support is related to support for Social Europe and whether the relationship with 
welfare state attitudes varies across different dimensions of Social Europe. To fully understand 
this linkage, we distinguish between attitudes toward the basic principles of the welfare state 
and welfare state critique, since their relationship with support for Social Europe is based on a 
different underlying logic.  
Explaining support for Social Europe  
Welfare attitudes: Spillover or obstacle to support for Social Europe? 
We propose two explanatory mechanisms for how welfare state attitudes may relate to 
support for Social Europe, namely spillover or obstacle. On the one hand, Social Europe can 
be considered as an instrument that aims to achieve similar objectives as national welfare states. 
The social dimension of the EU has developed to counterbalance the negative impact of 
 
economic deregulation and to prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in social standards (Fernandes and 
Maslauskaite, 2013). In this respect, Vandenbroucke (2013: 221) argues that a Social Union 
should guide and support the substantive development of national welfare states, based on 
general social standards and common objectives. From the perspective that Social Europe aims 
to defend the welfare state at the European level, it can be expected that advocates of the 
national welfare state will be more positive toward Social Europe. This spillover mechanism 
implies that citizens’ attitudes are congruent across policy levels (Muñoz et al., 2011). A 
spillover of pro-welfare attitudes to the European area is consistent with cue-taking theory, 
which assumes that citizens use their attitudes about domestic politics as a proxy to evaluate 
European integration (Anderson, 1998). Given that many citizens have limited interest in and 
awareness of European politics, general attitudes toward the welfare state can be activated as a 
heuristic and evoke attitudes toward the EU’s social dimension.  
On the other hand, it is argued that Social Europe challenges the foundations of national 
welfare states. Ferrera (2005) points out that national welfare states are based on ‘closure’, as 
compulsory social insurance draws clear boundaries between those who are entitled to social 
benefits and those who are not eligible to join the social security system. European integration, 
on the contrary, operates on the basis of ‘opening’, since it attempts to redraw the boundaries 
of welfare at the supranational level. The EU constrains the scope and content of national 
bounding decisions, as well as the right to impose boundaries as such (Ferrera, 2005, p. 3). 
Others have expressed concerns that European integration will not be able to restructure at the 
supranational level the type of solidarity that exists in national welfare states (Hemerijck, 2012; 
Scharpf, 2010). Integration not only affects the boundaries of social sharing systems, but also 
the internal design of welfare states, for instance in the areas of pensions, health care, and social 
assistance. The threat that Social Europe poses to the boundaries of welfare states can nourish 
 
competition for scarce resources, whereas the impact on the internal design of the welfare state 
can raise concerns–especially in the most advanced welfare states–about the maintenance of 
social protection levels. From this viewpoint, pro-welfare attitudes may obstruct support for 
Social Europe. First, citizens’ preferences regarding strong government responsibility for 
welfare and for income redistribution might be restricted to national boundaries. In this respect, 
pro-welfare state positions might coincide with welfare chauvinism. Second, citizens who are 
satisfied with their welfare regime may perceive Social Europe as a threat to institutionalized 
solidarity at the national level, whereas those who think that national institutions perform 
poorly may see it as an opportunity (Beaudonnet, 2015; Sanchez-Cuenca, 2000).  
Dimensions of support for Social Europe 
The notion of ‘Social Europe’ can refer to different basic principles and policy options, 
which vary in the extent to which they are intrusive to national welfare states. By intrusiveness, 
we understand the degree of interference in the boundaries of solidarity on which the welfare 
state is based. Accordingly, empirical research shows that citizens differentiate substantially in 
their attitudes concerning various aspects of Social Europe (Baute et al., 2017). Whether 
citizens’ welfare attitudes facilitate or obstruct support for Social Europe might depend on how 
a particular policy instrument intervenes in the national welfare state.  
The first, and least intrusive, aspect of current European social policy relates to the 
harmonization of national social policies. This is mainly addressed through binding and non-
binding social regulations, for instance in the fields of health and safety at work, working 
conditions, and equality (Falkner, 2010). The regulatory angle of Social Europe actually 
supports the welfare state, as it reinforces social protection, while leaving the boundaries of 
national welfare states untouched. More recently, the Open Method of Coordination was 
 
introduced to facilitate an upward convergence of social standards through mutual learning and 
peer pressure (de la Porte, 2013). Given the large diversity of national welfare states, complete 
harmonization is not aimed at. Nevertheless, the EU’s instruments for harmonization are a 
direct pressure toward more ‘bounded varieties of welfare’ (Falkner, 2010).  
Second, Social Europe also requires financial solidarity that goes beyond the national 
welfare state (Sangiovanni, 2013). Member state solidarity is implemented through various 
structural funds, which aim to reduce regional disparities in income, employment, investment, 
and growth within the EU (Allen, 2010). The fiscal aid to Eurozone countries, which 
overturned the ‘no bailout clause’ during the European sovereign debt crisis, is also considered 
as an instrument of international redistribution. In essence, member state solidarity provides 
financial assistance from more affluent regions to poorer ones, on top of existing forms of 
institutionalized solidarity within member states. Therefore, these transfers do not erode the 
autonomy of member states to conduct their own social policies. 
Third, the development of European social citizenship (Faist, 2001) is a cornerstone of 
Social Europe that operates according to an opposing dynamic to that of national welfare states. 
It implies that EU citizens acquire access to other member states’ social security schemes and 
that already-earned social security rights are transferrable between member states. The creation 
of an EU social citizenship space–which matches the EU’s territorial borders–strongly 
infringes on the boundaries of national welfare states (Ferrera, 2005, 2017). Currently, EU 
citizens receive equal social rights as nationals, without a European standard, as the amount, 
type, and duration of benefits depend on the country of residence. 
Turning to the most intrusive dimension, Social Europe can also be implemented by 
policy instruments that are based on interpersonal solidarity, defining rights and obligations 
 
among EU citizens (Sangiovanni, 2013). Such policy instruments have been proposed in the 
form of a European unemployment insurance scheme (Dullien, 2013), a European minimum 
income benefit (Peña-Casas and Bouget, 2014), and a European child benefit (Levy et al., 
2013). European social protection schemes would introduce new redistributive mechanisms 
and would enforce financial solidarity between EU citizens. Their level of contributions and 
benefits would be based on a relatively low common denominator between member states and 
could be topped up by the member states with national payments. Such measures would for 
instance be financed by a flat tax on all household income and limited to a maximum proportion 
of GDP. This is clearly the most intrusive component of Social Europe to the welfare state. 
Welfare state principles and welfare state critique 
To gain detailed insight into the spillover and obstacle mechanisms, we incorporate 
two clusters of welfare attitudes in this study, namely support for basic welfare state 
principles and welfare state critique. The distinction between the two is relevant, because 
their relationship with support for Social Europe rests on different theoretical foundations.  
Attitudes about welfare state principles refer to citizens’ preferences for redistribution 
and the government’s responsibility for welfare. Welfare state principles refer to what Roosma 
and colleagues (2013) label the ‘welfare mix’: The goals of the welfare state and the preferred 
range of government responsibility for welfare. First, the welfare mix refers to the diversity of 
welfare-generating forces. The state, the market, civil society, or the family can all operate as 
regulatory or redistributive institutions (Roosma et al., 2013). Our primary interest is citizens’ 
preferences regarding the role of the government in providing welfare. A second welfare state 
principle relates to the redistributive goals of the welfare state (van Oorschot and Meuleman, 
2012). Imposing equality of opportunities and/or outcomes is one of its main objectives 
 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Support for welfare state principles is thus strongly related to 
egalitarian views. The third aspect, the range of government responsibilities, refers to the 
specific areas of life in which the government should intervene (Roller, 1995). For instance, 
one might think that the government should ensure the provision of health care, pensions, 
unemployment benefits, child care, paid care leave, and so on.  
At the European level, a similar debate is ongoing regarding the role of government, 
the promotion of equality, and the range of government responsibilities. Cue-taking theory 
(Anderson, 1998) would predict a positive relationship between support for basic welfare state 
principles and support for Social Europe. For instance, it assumes that citizens with a more 
liberal orientation are strongly in favor of the EU’s internal market while being more opposed 
to European social policy, as they prefer less government intervention and fewer regulations. 
In line with this theory, empirical studies show that citizens with egalitarian views and those 
who prefer higher social spending are more in favor of member state solidarity (Beaudonnet, 
2014; Ciornei and Recchi, 2017). However, welfare state development has facilitated internal 
bonding between insiders by means of external bounding toward outsiders (Ferrera, 2005). 
Citizens mainly think about state intervention and welfare redistribution within national 
boundaries. Literature on welfare chauvinism confirms that endorsing the basic principles of 
the welfare state is not necessarily consistent with support for welfare redistribution to non-
nationals (van der Waal et al., 2010). As a result, support for welfare redistribution and 
government responsibility may translate into opposition to European interference in social 
policy, in particular regarding the Europeanization of social rights. 
In contrast to welfare state principles, welfare state critique does not refer to an 
ideological position as such, but to citizens’ assessment of the performance and consequences 
 
of their national welfare state. The performance of the welfare state generates a certain amount 
of institutional trust among citizens. We consider people’s trust in the social security system as 
an overarching evaluation of their national welfare state. However, more specific components 
of welfare state critique can be found in literature. Perceptions of the mistargeting of welfare 
benefits, and especially the overuse of benefits, are a sensitive subject among the European 
public (Ervasti, 2012). One might perceive that some beneficiaries are not deserving of or not 
entitled to receive social benefits, which in the latter case is considered as benefit abuse. 
Furthermore, perhaps the most criticized side effect of the welfare state is its economic 
consequences (van Oorschot et al., 2012). The critique is that the welfare state is a financial 
burden on the government budget, increases labor costs and tax levels, and makes labor markets 
inflexible. Together with (dis)trust in the social security system and perceptions of benefit 
overuse, we consider the perceived economic consequences as a major component of welfare 
state critique. 
Some scholars argue that both national and European institutions are evaluated similarly 
(Anderson, 1998), assuming that citizens’ evaluations rest on institutional trust in general 
(Muñoz et al., 2011). A spillover effect may also result from a direct involvement of national 
governments in EU decision-making (Kritzinger, 2003). In this regard, citizens’ support for 
Social Europe expresses support for incumbent authorities’ policies at the European level. The 
opposite argument – in favour of the obstacle mechanism – is also plausible, namely that 
national and European systems are evaluated differently, since citizens make cost/benefit 
evaluations of transferring sovereignty to the European level (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). Those 
who are satisfied with the functioning of the national welfare state may be more reserved about 
Social Europe, whereas those who perceive the welfare state as inefficient may embrace 
European social policy-making more enthusiastically (Beaudonnet, 2015). This implies that 
 
strong criticism of the welfare state may boost support for Social Europe, whereas little 
criticism is accompanied with lower support for Social Europe.  
Hypotheses  
We have argued that both support for the basic welfare state principles and welfare state 
critique can either facilitate or hinder support for Social Europe. The contrasting mechanisms 
of spillover and obstacle lead us to formulate two alternative hypotheses:  
Spillover hypothesis - H1: High levels of support for the basic principles of the welfare 
state (H1a) and low levels of welfare state critique (H1b) are positively related to 
support for Social Europe. 
Obstacle hypothesis - H2: High levels of support for the basic principles of the welfare 
state (H2a) and low levels of welfare state critique (H2b) are negatively related to 
support for Social Europe. 
Furthermore, the policy instruments of Social Europe do not intervene in national welfare states 
in the same way. EU social regulations and member state solidarity are the least intrusive to 
national welfare states, whereas European social citizenship and interpersonal solidarity 
challenge and undermine the sovereignty and boundaries of the welfare states to a larger extent. 
In line with the arguments set out in the previous section, we assume that the spillover 
mechanism of basic welfare state principles will be stronger for those aspects of Social Europe 
that are least intrusive, because citizens will perceive them as supportive to their national 
welfare state. More intrusive instruments such as European social citizenship and interpersonal 
solidarity may be perceived as more threatening to national welfare states and raise concerns 
about the consequences of these policies. In sum, given that the various dimensions of Social 
 
Europe differ in the extent to which they are intrusive to the welfare state, we expect the 
following differentiation in the spillover and obstacle mechanism as referred to in the previous 
hypotheses:  
H3: The spillover effect is stronger for less intrusive dimensions of Social Europe 
(H3a), whereas the obstacle effect is stronger for more intrusive dimensions (H3b). 
Furthermore, we expect the relative importance of the welfare state principles and welfare state 
critique to be depending on the intrusiveness of the different dimensions of Social Europe. For 
dimensions that intervene more strongly in national systems, citizens’ assessments of whether 
this will bring improvement or deterioration will gain importance. The opportunity costs of 
transferring social competences to the European level are much higher for citizens who are 
satisfied with the performance of their welfare state. Therefore, for the most intrusive 
components of Social Europe, the level of criticism on the welfare state is likely to be more 
important than the level of support for the basic principles of the welfare state. When it comes 
to less intrusive policy instruments, citizens’ may reason more according to their ideological 
preferences regarding redistribution and regulations, which can be expected to have a stronger 
effect on support for Social Europe than their level of welfare state critique. 
H4: For less intrusive dimensions of Social Europe, the level of support for the basic 
principles of the welfare state is more important in explaining citizens’ support for 
Social Europe (H4a), whereas for more intrusive dimensions of Social Europe, the level 
of welfare state critique is more important (H4b).  
Data and methodology 
Data 
 
We use data from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Abts et al., 2015). This 
post-electoral survey was carried out among a register-based probability sample of Belgians 
entitled to vote in the 2014 national elections. On completion of a computer-assisted personal 
interview (response rate 47%), respondents were asked to fill out a 20‐page drop‐off 
questionnaire, containing a specific module on Social Europe. Applying the principles of the 
Tailored Design Method (Dillman et al., 2014), we were able to convince 74% of the 
respondents to fill out and send back the questionnaire (N=1403).  
Variables 
Support for Social Europe is measured by a second-order latent factor, consisting of the 
four constitutive dimensions distinguished above (see Appendix 1-2 for question wording). 
Each of the dimensions is specified as a latent factor. First, attitudes toward harmonization are 
measured by support for four types of social regulations covering health and safety at work, 
maximum weekly working hours, minimum terms for paid leave, and minimum terms for 
maternity leave. Second, attitudes concerning member state solidarity are measured by three 
items referring to solidarity between the richer and poorer member states. These concern 
support in times of economic difficulties, the amount of tax money being redistributed, and the 
continuation of member state solidarity in the future. Third, opinions about European social 
citizenship are operationalized by four items concerning citizens’ attitudes toward the access 
of EU citizens to social benefits and protection in Belgium. One item concerns equal social 
rights, two items relate to prioritizing nationals, and one item refers to the conditionality of 
social protection. Lastly, interpersonal solidarity is measured by support for the 
implementation of a European social security system. One item concerns the implementation 
of an entire European social security system, whereas three items refer to European protection 
 
schemes for specific policy areas: Child allowances, minimum income benefits, and 
unemployment benefits. 
Support for welfare state principles is measured by three latent factors. First, the role 
of the state versus the market is measured by the following agree-disagree statements recorded 
on a five-point scale: ‘Society would be better off if the government intervened less in the 
market’ and ‘Businesses should have more freedom; therefore, regulations for businesses 
should be reduced.’ A higher factor score indicates that respondents support greater 
government intervention in the economy. Second, attitudes toward the principle of equality are 
measured by three items (answers on five-point scales): ‘The differences between classes ought 
to be smaller than they are at present,’ ‘The differences between high and low incomes should 
stay as they are,’ and ‘The government should reduce income differentials’. Higher scores 
indicate more egalitarian views. To measure attitudes concerning the range of government 
responsibilities, respondents were asked to what extent they think the government should be 
responsible for ‘a reasonable pension,’ ‘affordable health care’ and ‘a reasonable standard of 
living for the employed.’ Responses range from ‘no responsibility’ (0) to ‘full responsibility’ 
(10). 
Welfare state critique is also measured by three items. First, trust in the social security 
system is measured on a five-point scale ranging from ‘very little confidence’ (1) to ‘a great 
deal of confidence’ (5). Responses were recoded so that high scores indicate high levels of 
distrust. Second, perceptions of benefit overuse are measured by how often respondents think 
it occurs that people: ‘Use their health insurance although they are not sick,’ ‘Receive 
unemployment benefits although they could have a job if they wanted,’ and ‘Receive a 
minimum income although they are not actually poor.’ Responses range from ‘very often’ (1) 
 
to ‘never’ (5). A latent variable was constructed with a higher score indicating greater 
perceptions of abuse. Lastly, attitudes to the economic outcomes of the welfare state are 
measured by a latent variable with three items: ‘The welfare state costs too much money 
compared with what it yields,’ ‘The tasks of the welfare state are better left to the free market,’ 
and ‘The welfare state costs companies too much and harms our economy.’ Responses range 
from ‘completely disagree’ (1) to ‘completely agree’ (5). 
We take into account basic social-structural variables such as age and gender (0=male, 
1=female). Education level distinguishes between lower-secondary, higher-secondary, and 
tertiary education. Employment status consists of seven categories: White-collar worker, blue-
collar worker, self-employed, pensioner, student, unemployed or disabled, and inactive. 
Sociotropic and egocentric benefits are included by citizens’ opinion about whether EU 
membership has brought advantages to Belgium and to people like them. Responses are 
recoded into ‘mainly advantages’ (1) and ‘mainly disadvantages or no opinion’ (0). European 
identity is measured by citizens’ attachment to Europe, ranging from ‘not at all attached’ (1) to 
‘strongly attached’ (5). Since welfare attitudes are embedded in a larger political division of 
left-right ideology, we include left-right self-placement (0-10 scale). Responses are recoded 
into left (0-4), center (5) and right (6-10).  
An overview of the descriptive statistics is given in Appendix 3-4.  
Methods 
A second-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is estimated that captures the 
common component of attitudes towards the four dimensions (see Appendix 5). 1 The CFA 
model has a good fit; the RMSEA equals .032, the SRMR equals .043 and both the CFI (.967) 
and TLI (.960) are sufficiently close to 1. All first-order factor loadings have an absolute value 
 
larger than .48 and mostly above .60. This indicates that the items are sufficiently valid and are 
reliable indicators of the concepts they are intended to measure. The second-order factor 
loadings range from .329 (social regulations) to 1 (member state solidarity).2 
Hypotheses are tested by means of structural equation modeling, with welfare attitudes 
modeled as mediating variables between the social-structural control variables and support for 
Social Europe. The model captures the similarity of antecedents of the different dimensions of 
Social Europe by estimating general effects of the predictors on the second-order factor ‘Social 
Europe’. In addition, component-specific effects are included, by allowing significant direct 
effects of the predictors on the different dimensions of Social Europe (first-order factors). 
These direct effects indicate deviations from the common explanatory model, meaning that the 
impact of a certain predictor on a specific dimension of Social Europe is different from that on 
one’s overall attitude towards Social Europe. Appendix 6 shows a visual representation of the 
estimated model.  All analyses are performed using Mplus software version 7.3 and weighted 
by age, gender, and education level. Item non-response is addressed using full information 
maximum likelihood estimation.  
 
Results  
Spillover or obstacle? Common patterns 
Table 1 displays the standardized direct effects of the structural equation model. These 
include the common impact of the predictors on citizens’ overall support for Social Europe as 
well as the differential effects on the four specific attitudinal dimensions of Social Europe. The 
total effects of the predictors on attitudes toward Social Europe are reported in Appendix 7. 
These are the sum of the direct effects shown in Table 1 and the indirect effects that run through 
 
the mediating variables. Information about the two types of effects (direct and total) is required 
to gain detailed insight into the explanatory model. Whereas the direct effects are useful to 
reveal differential impacts of predictors, the total effects provide insight into the general 
patterns in our data. 
First, we look at the common effects of the social-structural variables on citizens’ 
overall support for Social Europe. Table 1 shows that when welfare state attitudes are taken 
into account, neither age, nor gender, nor education has a significant direct effect on support 
for Social Europe. With regard to employment status, we observe that pensioners, students, and 
the inactive are more in favor of Social Europe than blue-collar workers. The latter do not differ 
in their general attitude to Social Europe from white-collar workers, the self-employed, and 
welfare beneficiaries such as the unemployed and disabled. Furthermore, Table 1 shows that if 
citizens perceive that their country has benefited from EU membership, they support Social 
Europe more strongly, whereas perceived egocentric benefits are irrelevant in this respect. , 
People with a stronger European identity are also more supportive and right-wing voters are 
more opposed to Social Europe in general than those who position themselves at the center 
politically. 
The primary purpose of the analyses is to find out how support for the welfare state is 
related to support for Social Europe. To determine whether there is empirical evidence for a 
spillover or obstacle effect, we look at the common direct effects of the various welfare 
attitudes on the overarching Social Europe factor. With regard to welfare state principles, Table 
1 shows that opinions concerning the welfare mix in society are not significantly related to 
overall support for Social Europe. Being in favor of government intervention in the economy 
neither increases nor decreases overall support for Social Europe significantly. By contrast, 
 
attitudes concerning social redistribution are an important predictor of citizens’ general support 
for Social Europe. People who are more strongly in favor of an egalitarian society are 
significantly more supportive of the EU’s social dimension (β=.119; p=.031). Furthermore, 
Table 1 indicates that preferences for wide-ranging government responsibilities are unrelated 
to citizens’ overall support for Social Europe. In other words, people who think that the 
government should be responsible for providing reasonable pensions, affordable health care, 
and a reasonable standard of living for the unemployed, do not differ in their overall attitude 
toward the EU’s social pillar compared with those who believe that the government is not 
responsible for these matters at all. Turning to welfare state critique, lower levels of trust in 
the national social security system decrease support for European social policy (β=-.083; 
p=.041). Citizens who distrust their social security system do not put their trust in European 
social policy, as the obstacle hypothesis suggests. If people distrust their national social 
security, they also have more reservations about the EU’s social policy. In addition, citizens 
who think that overuse of social benefits is common, hold much more negative attitudes toward 
Social Europe in general (β=-.217; p<.001). Those who believe that the effectiveness of social 
benefits is poor–in terms of whether they reach the ‘right’ people–are thus less willing to 
expand the circle of solidarity to the rest of Europe. Lastly, concerns about the negative 
economic consequences of the welfare state have no significant direct effect on overall support 
for Social Europe.  
In summary, although only three out of six examined welfare state attitudes are 
significantly related to overall support for Social Europe, we notice a common spillover pattern.  
Endorsement of the basic welfare state principles is related with stronger support for Social 
Europe (H1a), which suggests that attitudes towards the national welfare state function as a 
proxy to form an opinion about Social Europe. Similarly, low levels of welfare state critique 
 
are accompanied with higher support for Social Europe (H1b), indicating that not only 
ideological preferences, but also institutional trust and evaluations are transferrable across 




Specific dimensions of support for Social Europe 
The second purpose of this analysis is to figure out whether the relationship between 
welfare attitudes and support for Social Europe varies across different dimensions of Social 
Europe. Most of the welfare attitudes indeed have component-specific effects that deviate from 
the general pattern. This is indicated in Table 1 by the significant direct effects of the predictors 
on the specific attitudinal dimensions of Social Europe. From left to right, the four specific 
dimensions are ranked from less intrusive to more intrusive to the welfare state. 
With regard to support for EU social regulations, the least intrusive dimension of Social 
Europe, Table 1 reveals several differential effects. First, we look at social-structural variables. 
The difference between blue-collar workers and the self-employed is larger with regard to 
support for EU social regulations than support for other facets of Social Europe. This can be 
explained by the fact that the self-employed are unlikely to benefit from these regulations, 
which are targeted at employees. Moreover, employers have to bear part of the costs of these 
regulations. The difference between the reference category of blue-collar workers and the 
unemployed or disabled is much larger for EU social regulations, with the latter group being 
more in favor of these measures. This is not illogical, since the unemployed and disabled are 
 
in higher need of social protection and the EU social regulations are most reinforcing of 
national welfare states compared with the other aspects of Social Europe. Turning to our main 
area of interest, all three welfare state principles have a differential effect on opinions about 
EU social regulations. Controlling for general attitudes to Social Europe, preferring state 
intervention above market forces is strongly positively related to support for EU social 
regulations (β=.238; p<.001). Obviously, aversion to government intervention obstructs the 
approval of active social policymaking in a regulatory way, regardless of the policy level. 
Egalitarian attitudes seem to be disproportionally more important regarding support for EU 
social regulations than for other components of Social Europe. The additional effect of 
egalitarianism is positive (β=.123; p=.034), indicating that citizens who are in favor of an equal 
society approve of the EU’s social regulations even more than we would expect given their 
general level of support for Social Europe. Furthermore, preferring wide-ranging government 
responsibilities for welfare has a direct, positive effect on support for EU social regulations 
(β=.191; p<.001). This means that even when we take into account citizens’ general score on 
the Social Europe factor, those who think that the state should provide reasonable pensions, 
unemployment benefits, and affordable health care, are significantly more in favor of the EU’s 
regulatory actions in the social domain. 
Second, several differential effects are found concerning attitudes toward European 
social citizenship. Education level has a direct positive effect on support for this facet of Social 
Europe. The fact that the higher educated have on average more transnational interactions 
might explain why they differ so much from the lower educated with regard to their support 
for this particular dimension of Social Europe. European social citizenship creates new social 
opportunities beyond the welfare state, which are mainly advantageous to the higher educated. 
Furthermore, the gap between left-oriented voters and those who position themselves at the 
 
center politically is larger concerning support for European social citizenship than for other 
dimensions of Social Europe. With regard to welfare state principles, a negative differential 
effect is observed for egalitarianism (β=-.107; p=.009). This indicates that egalitarianism has a 
weaker impact on support for the Europeanization of social rights compared with the other 
dimensions of Social Europe. In fact, the total effects shown in Appendix 7 indicate that overall, 
egalitarian views are not significantly related to support for European social citizenship (β=-
.050; p>.05). The opening up of national social security to mobile EU citizens might be 
perceived as most threatening to citizens’ own social position, which could explain why 
egalitarian views do not result in stronger support for equal social rights for EU citizens. 
Second, two components of welfare state critique have direct effects. While perceptions of 
benefit overuse have a strong negative impact on support for Social Europe in general, support 
for European social citizenship is even more strongly related to perceptions of benefit overuse 
(β=-.273; p<.001). This means that voters who believe welfare overuse is very common are 
even more skeptical about granting social rights to EU citizens than one would expect given 
their overall score on the Social Europe factor. In other words, perceiving the overuse of social 
benefits as more frequent hinders support for European social citizenship disproportionally 
more than citizens’ support for social regulations, member state solidarity, and an EU social 
security system. Further, controlling for citizens’ general attitude toward Social Europe, Table 
1 shows a direct negative effect of concerns about the economic consequences of the welfare 
state on support for European social citizenship (β=-.092; p=.035). People who believe that the 
welfare state is harmful to the economy are more negative with regard to granting EU citizens 
access to their welfare state. The logic behind this might be the belief that the number of 
beneficiaries of social protection schemes should not be expanded, to restrain the negative 
consequences for the welfare state. 
 
No differential effects are found for member state solidarity. As the confirmatory factor 
analysis shows (see Appendix 5), attitudes toward member state solidarity coincide completely 
with citizens’ general disposition toward Social Europe. This explains why antecedents cannot 
have differential effects on member state solidarity. With regard to support for a European 
social security system, we find that attachment to Europe has a positive differential effect. 
Stronger identification with Europe increases support for this policy instrument of 
interpersonal solidarity even more than it influences citizens’ overall level of support for Social 
Europe. This finding indicates that identity is an essential element of public support for 
transferring more social competences to the European level. Contrary to our expectations, we 
find no direct effects of welfare attitudes on support for a European social security system, 
which is the most intrusive to national welfare states. 
Our results indicate that the spillover effect of welfare attitudes from the national to the 
European level is not uniform for all facets of Social Europe. In addition to a set of common 
predictors, we find specific effects of welfare attitudes that deviate from the general pattern, 
confirming both hypotheses H3 and H4. More specifically, the spillover effect of welfare state 
principles is strongest for the dimension that is least intrusive to the national welfare state, 
namely EU social regulations. For example, the impact of egalitarian views is much stronger 
on support for EU social regulations than on support for more intrusive dimensions of Social 
Europe. For European social citizenship, the spillover effect seems to have weakened in favour 
of the obstacle effect. By contrast, the spillover effects of different types of welfare state 
critique are strongest for European social citizenship. These findings indicate that distrust and 
concerns regarding the effectiveness and consequences of welfare policies easily spill over to 
the European policy level, whereas support for basic principles such as government 
 
intervention and redistribution tend to be more nationally demarcated. The spillover effect 
depends not only on the dimension of Social Europe, but also on the type of welfare attitudes.  
Discussion 
Although the role of the EU and the scope of its competences in social policy are contested, 
the attitudes of citizens regarding Social Europe have received little previous scholarly 
attention. Given the strong historical link between welfare policies and the national state, we 
analyze whether public support for the national welfare state spills over to or obstructs support 
for Social Europe. Our results provide evidence for the spillover effect, as citizens holding 
more positive welfare attitudes are more in favor of Social Europe than those generally less 
supportive of the welfare state. This indicates that citizens recognize Social Europe ultimately 
has very similar objectives to those of national welfare states. It should be noted that Belgians 
already enjoy a relatively high level of social protection and thus that their opportunity cost of 
transferring competences to the European level are higher compared to citizens in less-
advanced welfare states This suggests that the spillover effect might be even stronger in other 
EU member states. That support for the welfare state facilitates support for Social Europe 
instead of being an obstacle - even in a country with an advanced welfare state - points to a 
window of opportunity for European policymakers to implement a more ambitious social 
agenda. In established Western-European welfare states, European policymakers proposing a 
deepening of the EU’s social dimension should not fear resistance from welfare state advocates. 
Instead, they will find a social basis for it among those who prefer strong welfare states and 
who praise their national social security system to a larger extent. Citizens who support social 
protection and welfare redistribution in general also see a role for the EU in these areas. 
Opposition to the growth of Social Europe will mainly be articulated by citizens who hold more 
negative views about the welfare state.  
 
Our analysis also shows, however, that creating public support for European social 
policy is more challenging in the case of policy instruments that are more intrusive to the 
national welfare state. The spillover effect of support for welfare state principles is strongest 
for European social policy instruments that leave the boundaries of the national welfare state 
untouched, and merely extend social protection along existing lines. Advocates of the welfare 
state support European regulations on health and safety at work very strongly, whereas their 
enthusiasm for instruments that imply redistribution between member states or EU citizens is 
somewhat more moderate. This indicates that citizens in favor of welfare redistribution 
especially welcome policies that support national welfare states in their key functions, without 
reshuffling the boundaries of welfare too profoundly. In addition, our analysis indicates that 
critical evaluations of the performance and consequences of the national welfare system have 
a stronger detrimental impact on support for European social policy that blurs the boundaries 
of national welfare states, namely equal social rights for mobile EU citizens. However, our 
expectations regarding support for a European social security system – the most intrusive to 
national welfare states – are not confirmed. Future studies should analyse whether this is due 
to measurement error or whether citizens perceive it as less intrusive than a European social 
citizenship. Nevertheless, our findings indicate that more-intrusive policy instruments of Social 
Europe might not be primarily rejected on the basis of Europe’s social engagement as such, but 
seem to be related to reservations about the practical feasibility, negative side effects, or 
potential abuse. For instance, if citizens perceive that social benefits are mistargeted, they are 
less willing to open up the boundaries of solidarity by granting EU citizens access to their 
welfare system. Although the less-intrusive policy instruments of Social Europe might seem a 
safer option to avoid public contestation, they do not tend to contribute much to the visibility 
of Social Europe in advanced welfare states. An important task for both European and national 
 
policymakers is therefore to inform citizens about how the EU engages in social policy and 
how it could protect ordinary citizens. Furthermore, this study illustrates that individual 
variation in support for Social Europe is not only explained by welfare attitudes, but also by 
European identity and citizens’ perceptions of their country’s benefits of EU membership. 
Social Europe thus evokes a very diverse set of attitudes that cannot be reduced to welfare 
issues alone. 
It should be noted that the scope of welfare attitudes included in this study is not 
exhaustive. For instance, we did not include accurate measurements of satisfaction with the 
coverage or quality of national welfare provisions. If citizens think that their national welfare 
system does not provide enough protection, they might be more supportive of EU social policy. 
Furthermore, the positive relationship between support for the principles of the welfare state 
and support for Social Europe might even be stronger in less-advanced national welfare states. 
In these countries, citizens are protected to a lesser extent by their welfare policies, which can 
trigger high expectations about Social Europe among left-wing voters. Future research is 
needed to examine whether the strength of the spillover effect varies across EU member states.  
Notes 
1. Including an error correlation between two items of the social regulations scale 
improved the model fit and is theoretically justified because both refer to regulations 
concerning leave. 
2. Factor loading was constrained to 1, because it exceeded 1 when freely estimated. 
Member state solidarity thus coincides completely with citizens’ general attitude 
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TABLE 1. Direct effects of social-structural variables and welfare attitudes on support for 
















 β β β β β 
Social-structural variables      
Age  -.073     









































Egocentric benefits EU 
membership 
.038     
Sociotropic benefits EU 
membership 
.229***     
European identity .284***    .078* 













Welfare state principles       
Welfare mix: State versus 
market  
.005 .238***    
Goals of the state: Equality .119* .123*  -.107**  
Range of government 
responsibility 
.061 .191***    
Welfare state critique       
Distrust in social security  -.083*     
Effectiveness: Benefit 
overuse 
-.217***   -.273***  
Outcomes: Economic 
consequences  
-.061   -.092*  
      
Explained variance .423 .319 1.000 .540 .313 
Note: n=1327; χ²=1371.12; df=710; RMSEA=.026; CFI=.923; TLI=.905; SRMR=.036. 
*** p≤.001; ** p≤.01; * p≤.05. 
 
 




Below are a number of measures that the European Union has taken in recent years. Can you indicate for each of the following measures whether 
it is a (very) good or a (very) bad thing that the EU has taken these measures? 








A very good 
thing 
D30_1 The EU imposes a number of obligations on employers to protect the 
health and safety of workers 
0.22 0.94 8.53 59.36 30.95 
D30_2 The EU prohibits a workweek of more than 48 hours (including 
overtime) for workers in the EU member states 
1.74 8.90 24.82 44.65 19.90 
D30_4 The EU posits that workers in the EU member states are entitled to 
paid leave for a period of at least 4 weeks 
0.22 2.39 15.29 54.35 27.75 
D30_5 The EU obliges all EU member states to provide at least 4 months of 
paid maternity leave to women who gave birth 
1.45 6.24 21.25 44.09 26.98 
Member state 
solidarity 
The following statements are about solidarity between member states of the European Union. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements? 
  Completely 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree  Completely 
agree 
D33_1 Rich EU countries such as Belgium should always support other 
member states that experience serious economic difficulties 
5.93 27.11 36.59 27.98 2.39 
D33_2 Too much tax money is going from the prosperous EU countries to 
the poorer EU countries 
2.62 14.99 43.52 32.24 6.62 
D33_3 The solidarity between the richer and poorer EU countries should not 
be broken 




Now we would like to ask your opinion on whether EU citizens should have access to social security in Belgium. By EU citizens we mean 
people who have come to Belgium from other EU member states and live here. Social security provides citizens with an income in case of 
illness, unemployment and disability. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
  Completely 
disagree  
Disagree  Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Agree  Completely 
agree 
D15_1 EU citizens should receive the same social facilities as Belgians 10.16 28.30 28.66 28.23 4.64 
D15_3 In the allocation of social benefits Belgians should have priority over 
EU citizens 
4.42 23.50 26.11 35.10 10.88 
D15_4 EU citizens should first have a job before they gain access to social 
services 
1.59 7.39 16.96 46.16 27.90 
D15_5 Let’s support the poor in our country first, before we help the poor 
coming from other EU countries 













D38 General systemb 14.83 37.92 38.64 8.61  
D39 Child benefitb 11.72 29.09 47.25 11.94  
D40 Minimum income benefitb 10.00 30.00 49.06 10.94  
D41 Unemployment benefitb 11.27 34.97 44.51 9.25  
aAnswer categories are reversed. bQuestions are given in Appendix 2. 





Currently, each member state of the European Union is responsible for its own 
system of social security. This social security provides citizens a minimum 
protection in the event of illness, old age, unemployment or disability. Some are 
saying we should stablish a common system of social security within the European 
Union, to which all EU citizens pay contributions. Are you for or against such a 
common system of social security at the EU level? 
Introduction 
D39-D41 
In the social policy domain, the European Union can do many things. In the 
following four questions we describe four different measures the European Union 




One possible measure is the introduction of a European child benefit. Through this 
measure the EU guarantees a minimum benefit for children in the European Union 
that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. To fund the European child 
benefit, each country would pay according to its wealth. Additionally, member 
states could opt to further increase the child benefit in their own country at their 
own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of such a European minimum 





A second possible measure is the introduction of a European minimum income. 
Through this measure the EU guarantees a minimum income benefit for all poor 
people in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living in each country. 
To fund the European minimum income, each country would pay according to its 
wealth. Additionally, member states could opt to further increase the minimum 
income in their own country at their own expense. Are you for or against the 





A third possible measure is the introduction of a European unemployment benefit. 
Through this measure the EU guarantees a minimum unemployment benefit for all 
temporary unemployed in the European Union that is adapted to the cost of living 
in each country. To fund the European unemployment benefit, each country would 
pay according to its wealth. Member states could opt to further increase the benefit 
in their country at their own expense. Are you for or against the introduction of such 
a European unemployment benefit by the EU? 
 
 
APPENDIX 3. Descriptive statistics social-structural background variables 
 
 Mean / % S.D. N 
Age 51.70 17.53 1403 




























Egocentric benefits EU membership 
Mainly advantages 





Sociotropic benefits EU membership 
Mainly advantages 





















APPENDIX 4. Descriptive statistics welfare state attitudes 
 
 Mean S.D. Factor-
loading 
N 
Role of the state versus the market      
Society would be better off if the government intervenes less 
in the market 
2.87 0.88 .811 1373 
 
Businesses should get more freedom. Therefore, regulations 
for businesses should be reduced 
2.82 0.91 .469 1377 
Principle of equality      
The differences between classes ought to be smaller than they 
are at present 
3.90 0.88 .673 1400 
The differences between the high and the low incomes should 
stay as they are 
2.21 0.93 -.617 1397 
The government should reduce income differentials 3.60 1.03 .651 1398 
Range of government responsibility      
Making sure the elderly have a reasonable pension  8.37 1.61 .748 1402 
Making sure there is affordable health care for all  8.78 1.38 .699 1402 
Making sure that the unemployed have a reasonable standard 
of living 
6.59 2.22 .459 1401 
Distrust in social security 2.56 0.78 / 1400 
Benefit overuse     
That people use their health insurance although they are not 
sicka 
3.44 0.88 .663 1394 
That people receive unemployment benefits although they 
could have a job if they wanteda 
3.79 0.85 .756 1387 
That people receive a living wage (minimum income) although 
they are not actually poora 
3.18 0.89 700 1385 
Economic consequences of welfare state     
The welfare state costs too much money compared with what 
it yields 
3.03 0.95 .642 1373 
The tasks of the welfare state are better left to the free market  2.30 0.82 .486 1381 
The welfare state costs companies too much and harms our 
economy 
2.85 0.90 .681 1368 




APPENDIX 5. Measurement model of attitudes toward Social Europe (weighted by age, 




Note. χ²= 212.251; df=86; RMSEA=.032; CFI=.967; TLI=.960; SRMR=.043; n= 1401; estimator= MLR. 
APPENDIX 6. Attitudes toward Social Europe explained by structural and attitudinal predictors – significant direct effects 
 
Note. The general effects are depicted by the arrows from the independent variables on the left side and in the bottom of the figure, pointing to the second-order 
latent factor ‘Social Europe’. Differential effects of predictors on first-order attitudinal dimensions are illustrated by dashed lines. 
APPENDIX 7. Total effects of social-structural variables and welfare attitudes on support 














 β β β β β 
Social-structural variables      
Age  -.028 .007 -.028 .003 -.015 









































































Egocentric benefits .033 .010 .033 .019 .017 
Sociotropic benefits .270*** .089*** .270*** .176*** .141*** 
European identity .314*** .083*** .314*** .188*** .242*** 
























Fundamental welfare principles      
Welfare mix: State versus market .005 .239*** .005 .002 .003 
Goals of the state: Equality .119* .150* .119** -.050 .062** 
Range: Social security .061 .205*** .061 .030 .032 
Welfare state critique      
Distrust in social security -.083* -.019 -.083* -.040* -.043* 
Effectiveness: Benefit overuse -.217*** -.049*** -.217*** -.377*** -.113*** 
Outcomes: Economic consequences -.061 -.014 -.061 -.122* -.032 
      
Explained variance .423 .319 1.000 .540 .313 
Note. n= 1327; χ²= 1371.12; df= 710; RMSEA= .026; CFI= .923; TLI= .905; SRMR= .036. 
*** p ≤ .001. ** p ≤ .01. * p ≤ .05. 
 
 
